A broad range of defeasible reasoning forms has been explicated by prioritized adaptive logics. However, the relative lack in meta-theory of many of these logics stands in sharp contrast to the frequency of their application. This paper presents the first comparative study of a large group of prioritized adaptive logics. Three formats of such logics are discussed: superpositions of adaptive logics, hierarchic adaptive logics from [20] and logics in the AL⊏-format from [24]. We restrict the scope to logics that use the strategy Minimal Abnormality. It is shown that the semantic characterizations of these systems are equivalent and that they are all sound with respect to either of these characterizations. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for the completeness and equivalence of the consequence relations of the three formats are established. Some attractive properties, including Fixed Point and the Deduction Theorem, are shown to hold whenever these conditions are obeyed.
Introduction
Prioritized Adaptive Logics. Adaptive logics (henceforth ALs) are formal systems that model and explicate various forms of human reasoning: reasoning with inconsistent premises [1] , inductive generalization [6, 4] , abduction [13, 11] , reasoning on the basis of conflicting norms [10, 14] , argumentation [19] , belief revision [25] , etc.
1 Many consequence relations from the literature have been reformulated as ALs, see e.g. [7, 9, 16, 27] . These achievements underline the strength of ALs as formal modeling tools and the unificatory power of the adaptive logic program.
ALs are first and foremost developed to capture defeasible reasoning forms (DRFs), i.e. reasoning forms in which certain inferences may be retracted in view of later insights. One of the most important developments within the AL program is the definition of a canonical format, the so-called standard format for ALs. This format encompasses a dynamic proof theory and semantics. A rich and attractive meta-theory has been shown to hold generically for all ALs formulated in the standard format (see [3] ): they are sound and complete, their consequence relation is idempotent, cautiously monotonic, etc. Most ALs have been successfully expressed within this format, whence it provides a good basis for a unifying study of DRFs.
Every AL in standard format is characterized by a triple: (i) a lower limit logic (henceforth LLL), (ii) a set of abnormalities Ω and (iii) a strategy. The LLL is a monotonic logic, the rules of which are unconditionally valid in the AL. The AL strengthens its LLL by considering a certain set of formulas (the elements of Ω) as abnormal, and by interpreting premises "as normally as possible". Semantically, this is realized by means of a selection on the set of LLL-models, in the vein of Shoham [15] . How this selection proceeds, depends on the strategy of the AL, which can be either Reliability or Minimal Abnormality.
In this paper, we will confine ourselves to the latter strategy. In this case, the AL selects the LLL-models that verify a minimal set of abnormalities -the details will be spelled out in Section 2.
2
Notwithstanding its successes, the standard format does not incorporate prioritized ALs. These are elegant tools to model specific kinds of prioritized defeasible reasoning, i.e. the kind of defeasible reasoning in which defeasible assumptions with different degrees of priority play a role. Examples of such DRFs are: reasoning with prioritized belief bases [8] or imperatives [23] ; inductive generalization with a preference for the strongest hypotheses [4] ; ampliative reasoning supported by background knowledge [6] ; inductive generalization of abduced hypotheses [22] .
The most common way to deal with prioritized DRFs within the adaptive logic program is by the superposition of several ALs in standard format. Roughly speaking, this is done as follows: where AL 1 , AL 2 , . . . are ALs in standard format that have the same LLL, and where Cn AL i (Γ) denotes the AL i -consequence set of Γ, we characterize the superposition of logics, SAL, by Cn SAL (Γ) = ". . . Cn AL3 (Cn AL2 (Cn AL1 (Γ))) . . ."
In [2] , a semantics for these systems was proposed, in terms of a sequential selection of models. For Minimal Abnormality, this semantics is defined as follows: first we select the LLL-models of Γ that are minimally abnormal with respect to AL 1 ; from the resulting set of models, we select those that are minimally abnormal with respect to AL 2 , etc (see Section 3 for the precise definitions).
Although for some concrete applications, superpositions of ALs were equipped with a proof theory (see e.g. [19, 6, 18] ), there has been no attempt so far to formulate a generic proof theory for SAL, and to prove that its derivability relation coincides with the consequence relation described above, or is sound and complete with respect to the intended semantics of SAL. 3 More generally, there has been a substantial lack of meta-theory on these combinations of ALs. The results that have been obtained so far are fairly negative for Minimal Abnormality: superpositions of ALs that have the Minimal Abnormality Strategy lack many of the aforementioned properties which render the standard format so attractive. To mention but a few: their consequence relation lacks both soundness and completeness with respect to the above semantic characterization; it is neither idempotent, nor cautiously monotonic. 4 Another way to capture prioritized DRFs by means of a combination of ALs in standard format was put forward in [20] under the name hierarchic adaptive logics. There the central idea was to take the union of the consequence sets of several ALs. Where each logic AL i has LLL as its lower limit logic, this combination is defined as follows: 5 Cn HAL (Γ) = Cn LLL (Cn AL1 (Γ) ∪ Cn AL2 (Γ) ∪ . . .)
Semantically, the set of HAL-models of Γ is the intersection of all the sets of AL i -models. A generic proof theory was defined for HAL, and proven to be adequate with respect to Cn HAL (Γ) in [20] . Nevertheless, the hierarchic format suffers from the same meta-theoretic problems as superpositions of ALs: no fixed point, no completeness with respect to a non-redundant semantics, etc (see [20] where these results are documented).
In [24] , the format AL ⊏ for prioritized adaptive logics is presented, and it is proven that the meta-theoretic properties of the standard format easily generalize to this new format. 6 We refer to Section 2 for an overview of some technical results from [24] . As for flat ALs, every logic in AL ⊏ -format is characterized by a triple: an LLL, a sequence of sets of abnormalities Ω 1 , Ω 2 , . . . and a strategy: ⊏-Reliability or ⊏-Minimal Abnormality. The semantics of AL ⊏ -logics that use ⊏-Minimal Abnormality, is obtained by a lexicographic selection procedure -see Section 2.1 for more details.
In the remainder, we use the superscript m to refer to the Minimal Abnormalityvariants of the three aformentioned formats: AL m ⊏ , SAL m and HAL m .
Content and Outline of This Paper. We will first provide a general characterization of flat adaptive logics and logics in the AL m ⊏ -format, and introduce some notational conventions for the rest of the paper (Section 2). Next, we will show that three classes of prioritized ALs (logics in AL 4 See [5, Chapter 6] for more details. 5 As we will see in Section 4.2, the logics AL 1 , AL 2 , . . . have to fulfill certain specific restrictions in order to get a well-behaved hierarchic logic -we refer to [20] for more details. 6 In a sense, all formats for prioritized ALs are generalizations of the standard format: if there is only one priority level, the "prioritized" AL reduces to an AL in standard format. However, the generalization which leads to AL⊏ is more fundamental, in that the crucial concepts of the standard format are generalized, in order to give the defeasibility a prioritized flavor -see [24] for the details.
To arrive at (ii), we will prove that every logic in the format of SAL m c is sound with respect to its semantics (see Section 4, Theorem 15.2).
It is worthwhile to stress that all the above results are proven generically, i.e. the meta-proofs only rely on the properties of the formats, not on particularities of the logics defined in these formats. Property (i) contributes to the argument that the semantic consequence relation defined by these logics and, in view of the soundness and completeness of AL m ⊏ , also the AL m ⊏ -consequence relation is a robust concept in the context of prioritized consequence relations. 7 (ii) is of particular interest in view of the fact that AL m ⊏ , SAL m c and HAL m are each characterized by their own peculiar semantics and proof theory. This means that we obtain a great variety of methods to prove that a formula is an AL m ⊏ -consequence of a set of premises.
In Appendix C, we show that (iii) fails in cases where the restrictions referred to in (iii) are not obeyed. However, as shown in Section 6, whenever the restrictions hold, properties such as Fixed Point and the Deduction Theorem can be easily transferred from AL and HAL m are defined without any reference to proof theories. Hence, we will not spell out the generic proof theory of HAL m in this paper (see [20] ), and we consider that of SAL m c as a topic for future research. Also, we refer to [4, 5, 23, 17, 20, 24] for concrete applications of each of the aforementioned formats.
Flat and Prioritized Adaptive Logics
In this section, we introduce and define the format AL m ⊂ of flat ALs and the format AL m ⊏ of prioritized ALs from [24] . We restrict ourselves to the semantics of both formats (the proof theories are defined in Appendix A.1). We will first provide the official semantics of the systems (Section 2.1), and next define an alternative characterization of their sets of models (Section 2.2). The latter will turn out very useful for certain meta-proofs in the remainder of this paper. After that, we will briefly discuss normal premise sets, i.e. premise sets that do not give rise to any abnormalities (Section 2.3). Finally, we introduce some notions which will facilitate the meta-proofs in the remainder of this paper (Section 2.4). Unless specified differently, all results from this section are established and illustrated in detail in [3] , [5] and [24] -all metaproofs can be found there. Before we start, let us introduce some conventions.
Throughout this paper, all formulas are assumed to be finite strings in a given formal language. We will use A, B, C, . . . as metavariables for formulas, and Γ, ∆, Θ, . . . as metavariables for sets of formulas. Where N is the set of naturals numbers without 0, we will use i, j, k, . . . as metavariables for members of N, and I, J, K, . . . as metavariables for initial sequences of N. Where I = {1, . . . , n}, let I = def n; where I = N, let I = def ∞. Let L be a logic with a characteristic
The Official Semantics
Every (flat or prioritized) adaptive logic is based on a lower limit logic LLL + . LLL + is required to be compact, transitive, reflexive and monotonic. The superscript "+" refers to the fact that the lower limit logic is obtained by enriching a monotonic logic LLL with classical connectives that are indicated by a check mark:¬,∨,∧,⊃, and for the predicative case also∃,∀. This enrichment is motivated by technical, meta-theoretic and philosophical reasons -we refer to [24, Section 2.1] where these are spelled out.
Where W is the set of formulas in the language L of LLL, W + is obtained by closing W under the checked connectives. 8 Intuitively, every AL models a reasoning process based on formulas in W, but uses formulas in W + to explicate this reasoning process. Hence, although an AL is defined as a function ℘(W + ) → ℘(W + ), in concrete applications, premise sets are usually subsets of W. Nevertheless, for metatheoretic purposes (e.g. when considering the superposition of consequence relations), it is easier to let Γ refer to any subset of W + . Unless specified differently, we will do this in the remainder.
The AL strengthens LLL + , by considering formulas of a certain form false "as much as possible". These formulas are called abnormalities. So a necessary ingredient of any AL is a set of abnormalities Ω, which is a set of formulas specified by a logical form in L + . A flat AL considers each abnormality to be "equally bad". For instance, if Γ = {A ∨ B}, where A, B ∈ Ω and where ∨ behaves classically, then neither¬ A, nor¬ B will be an adaptive consequence of Γ.
Prioritized ALs are also defined in terms of LLL + and a set of abnormalities Ω, but this time Ω is further specified in terms of a sequence of sets, each associated with a certain priority level i ∈ I. In other words, we consider not one set of abnormalities, but a (possibly infinite) sequence of such sets: Ω i i∈I , which yields a prioritized set of abnormalities Ω = i∈I Ω i . Abnormalities of level 1 are treated as the "worst" abnormalities by the prioritized AL, those of level 2 as the "second worst", and so on. Hence the logic first tries to avoid the abnormalities from Ω 1 , next those from Ω 2 , etc. Suppose that in the above example, A ∈ Ω 1 and B ∈ Ω 2 − Ω 1 . In that case,¬ A, and hence also B will be a consequence of Γ.
At the semantic level, every AL selects a subset of the set of LLL + -models, in view of the abnormalities they verify. This requires some notational conventions. We first define the abnormal part of an LLL
Let ≺ be a metavariable for ⊏ and ⊂. Then the logic AL m ≺ selects the LLL + -models of Γ whose abnormal part is ≺-minimal:
With the above definitions and the regular definition of semantic consequence (Γ |= L A iff A is true in every M ∈ M L (Γ)), we obtain the semantic consequence relations |= AL m ⊂ and |= AL m ⊏ . As pointed out in Section 1, the standard format and the AL ⊏ -format also encompass a proof theory which yields a syntactic consequence relation ⊢ AL m ≺ , that is sound and complete with respect to |= AL m ≺ . We refer to Appendix A.1 for this proof theory. We define
We continue this section with some theorems and a corollary, each of which will be referred to in the remainder of this paper. Recall that, unless stated differently, Γ ⊆ W + :
Theorem 1 Each of the following holds:
The last result which we mention here is proven in Appendix A.2. It states that for a very specific kind of premise sets Γ ⊆ W + , the logic AL m ⊂ is sound and complete as well:
The Alternative Characterization of
The alternative characterization of the set of AL m ≺ -models of a given Γ is based on the set of minimal disjunctions of abnormalities that are LLL + -derivable from Γ. For flat ALs, this characterization is well-known from the metatheory of the standard format -see e.g. [3] where it is established and applied; it was generalized to the AL Let Ψ = {∆ k ⊆ Ω | k ∈ K}. We say that ϕ ⊆ Ω is a choice set of Ψ iff for every k ∈ K, ϕ ∩ ∆ k = ∅. For the border case where Ψ = ∅, this means that every set ϕ ⊆ Ω is a choice set of Ψ, including the empty set.
The following two facts give two salient properties of choice sets of Σ(Γ) and their relation to LLL + -models of Γ:
Fact 2 If Γ has LLL + -models, then for every choice set ϕ of Σ(Γ), there is an
Just as we did with the abnormal parts of models, we may rank the choice sets of Σ(Γ) according to the partial orders ⊂ and ⊏. As before, let ≺ be a meta-variable for these partial orders. We say that ϕ is a ≺-minimal choice set of Ψ iff there is no choice set ψ of Ψ such that ψ ≺ ϕ.
So, in view of the minimal disjunctions of abnormalities that are LLL + -derivable from Γ, we obtain a set of sets of abnormalities Φ ≺ (Γ). The following theorem provides the link between Φ ≺ (Γ) and the set of AL m ≺ -models of Γ:
Theorem 6 Each of the following holds:
In view of this correspondence between M AL m ≺ (Γ) and Φ ≺ (Γ), Theorem 4.1 has the following counterpart:
In view of Theorem 6, we can establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the membership of Cn AL m ≺ (Γ), whenever Γ ⊆ W:
The left-right direction of the above theorem also holds for the more general case where Γ ⊆ W + :
Normal Premise Sets
Every flat adaptive logic in standard format has a unique upper limit logic ULL, which is the logic that trivializes all abnormalities of the AL. Semantically, ULL is obtained as follows. We say that M ∈ M LLL + (Γ) is normal iff M A for every A ∈ Ω. We write Γ |= ULL A iff A is true in every normal LLL + -model of Γ. Similarly, for the prioritized logic AL m ⊏ = LLL + , Ω i i∈I , m , we obtain the associated ULL by defining normal models as those LLL + -models that falsify every member of Ω = i∈I Ω i . The following is immediate:
In [3] , it is shown that ULL is a monotonic logic that is sound and complete. Hence by Fact 3 and Theorem 1.1:
We say that a premise set Γ is normal iff it has normal models; alternatively, iff Γ ∪ Ω¬ is LLL + -satisfiable. The following is proven in [24]:
In other words, if it is possible to avoid all abnormalities, then the adaptive logic will do so. In Section 4.3, we will see that this result can be extended to the formats SAL m c and HAL m . There we will also formulate a stronger, prioritized variant of this theorem and prove it for each of AL 
Some Notational Conventions
To close the gap between, on the one hand, combinations in terms of flat adaptive logics, and on the other hand logics in the AL m ⊏ -format, it will be convenient to define logics that only consider abnormalities up to a certain rank i ∈ I. For every i ∈ I, let Ω (i) = Ω 1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ω i . We define the lexicographic order up to level i as follows:
We define the prioritized adaptive logic AL
just as AL m ⊏ , but replacing the whole sequence Ω i i∈I by Ω j j≤i , and replacing ⊏ by ⊏ (i) . Similarly, we characterize the flat adaptive logic AL -semantics in terms of minimal choice sets. We say that Dab(∆) is a minimal
(Γ), and
In view of the definitions of
and Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ), we have:
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Fact 5 Each of the following holds for every i ∈ I:
In the remainder of this paper, we will skip the sub-and superscript ⊂, in order to facilitate the reading and to stay as close as possible to the notational conventions of the adaptive logics program. Hence we will write Φ(Γ) instead of Φ ⊂ (Γ) and AL m instead of AL m ⊂ .
Two equivalent Semantic Characterizations
In this section we will define the semantics for superposed adaptive logics and for hierarchic adaptive logics. As explained in Section 1, both formats are defined in terms of a combination of a sequence of flat ALs AL 
Superposition of Selections
In the introduction we have already informally explicated the idea of the sequential selections that constitute the semantics of SAL m . We will now make this idea formally precise. Where SAL m is characterized by the sequence of flat adaptive logics AL m i i∈I , its semantics is defined as follows:
Fact 7 Each of the following holds for every i ∈ I: (Γ) i∈I converges to its limes inferior resp. to its limes superior due to the fact that the sequence is anti-monotonic (see Fact 7.1).
Proof. Assume that the antecedent holds, but In the remainder we will often restrict our focus to a specific class of superposed adaptive logics, namely of sequences of the type AL 
Hence by Definition 1 and Definition 2, there is an i ∈ I and an M ′ ∈ M LLL + (Γ) such that (1) for every j < i: 
Intersection of Selections
Similar to superpositions of ALs, hierarchic ALs are characterized on the basis of sequences of flat adaptive logics: AL 1 , AL 2 , . . . . In the hierarchic case however, the logics in the sequence have to fulfill the condition that Ω i ⊆ Ω i+1 . Thus, the sequences that characterize hierarchical adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy can be written as AL 
As for SAL m c , we can prove that the semantics of every logic HAL m is equivalent to that of AL m ⊏ , where the latter is defined by LLL, Ω i i∈I , m :
. By Definition 1 and Definition 2, there is an i ∈ I and an M ′ ∈ M LLL + (Γ) such that (1) for every j < i:
Some Corollaries
The following corollary is one of the central results presented in this paper. It shows that the semantics of hierarchic adaptive logics and logics in the AL 
In the remainder of this section, let PAL ∈ {AL Corollary 3 Each of the following holds: 
Two Consequence Relations
In this section, we provide a definition of Cn SAL m (Γ) and Cn HAL m (Γ). We will show that the SAL m -consequence relation is both reflexive and closed under LLL + . Next, we will show that each logic in the specific class of logics SAL m c is sound with respect to the semantic characterization from Section 3.1. We will recapitulate the soundness result for HAL m from [20] and derive from this that AL m ⊏ is always at least as strong as HAL m . Finally, we will show that whenever it is possible in view of the lower limit logic and Γ, to falsify all abnormalities up to a certain level i, then each of SAL m , HAL m and AL m ⊏ will do so.
Superpositions of Consequence Relations
Before we turn to the definition of SAL m , recall that this format is more general than SAL 
.
Let us first consider some properties that hold for SAL m in general. Since every logic AL m i is reflexive, we immediately get: The following lemma requires a bit more explanation. As Theorem 3 states, every logic AL m i is closed under LLL + . However, this theorem is restricted to the case where Γ ⊆ W.
14 In order to generalize it to SAL m , we first need to establish the LLL + -closure of AL m , for a specific kind of premise sets Γ ⊆ W + : 13 Note that the sequence Cn SAL m i (Γ) i∈I converges to its limes inferior resp. to its limes superior due to the fact that the sequence is monotonic (see Fact 9.3).
14 There are Γ ⊆ W + for which it fails -see [21, Chapter 2, Section 8] for an example. 
By (1) 
The preceding obervations allow us to establish the main result of this section. This concerns the more specific class of logics SAL m c , defined in terms of the sequence of logics AL m (i) i∈I . In the remainder, we prove that these logics are sound with respect to the sequential superposition of semantic selections from Section 3.1, whence by Corollary 1 they are also sound with respect to the other semantic selections featured in this paper.
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Theorem 15 Each of the following holds for every i ∈ I:
Proof. 
whence by the Reflexivity of SAL
(Γ), which contradicts ( †).
(Γ), whence by Definition 7, By Theorems 1.2 and 12, we obtain:
Unions of Consequence Sets
In the notational conventions from the current paper -see also Section 3.3 -, we can define the HAL m -consequence relation as follows:
We refer to [20] for illustrations of how this combination leads to a prioritized treatment of the sets of abnormalities Ω i i∈I . Theorem 14 from that paper states that HAL m is sound with respect to the semantics defined in Section 3.2:
By Corollary 1 and Theorem 1.2, we immediately have:
Normal Premise Sets Revisited
In Section 2.3, we saw that whenever Γ ∪ Ω¬ has LLL + -models, then AL m ≺ is identical to its upper limit logic ULL. As we will see below, this result can be generalized to sequential superpositions of ALs, as well as to hierarchic ALs -see Theorem 19 below. However, in the case of prioritized ALs, one may also wonder whether a slightly stronger property holds. That is, suppose that for some i ∈ I, it is possible to verify all members of Γ, yet also falsify all abnormalities up to level i. In that case, it seems a desirable property for a prioritized logic PAL that Cn LLL + (Γ ∪ Ω¬ (i) ) ⊆ Cn PAL (Γ) -in other words, that the prioritized logic indeed considers all the members of Ω (i) to be false.
To formally express this property, we introduce the concepts of normality at level i, resp. up to level i:
The following is immediate in view of Definition 9:
Fact 10 If Γ is normal up to level i, then each of the following holds:
1.
Γ is normal at level j, for every j ≤ i 2.
Γ ∪ Ω¬ (j) is normal at level j + 1, for every j < i 3.
Cn LLL + (Γ ∪ Ω¬ (j) ) is normal at level j + 1, for every j < i
In the remainder, we use ULL i to refer to the upper limit logic of AL In view of Theorem 17, Theorem 18 and the monotonicity and compactness of LLL + , the proof of the following can be safely left to the reader:
Equivalence Results
In this section, we establish the third major result we promised in the introduction, i.e. that given certain weak conditions, the logics SAL 
The Basic Criteria for Equivalence
Note that the following is the case: (3) expresses that the set of PAL-models is characterized by means of the PAL-consequence set: the models of the prioritized adaptive logic are exactly those LLL + -models that verify the PAL-consequences. This is a central criterion since it is sufficient for both, the soundness and completeness of PAL (point 1.), and for the equivalence of the consequence relation of the three prioritized adaptive logics that are presented in this paper (point 2.).
The criteria for soundness and equivalence are defined by means of sets of complements of minimal choice sets. Where ≺ ∈ {⊂, ⊏}, . By Theorem 6, for every ϕ ∈ Φ ≺ (Γ), there is a j ∈ J such that A j ∈ ϕ. But then
Corollary 8 Where Γ ⊆ W:
c Φ ≺ (Γ) has no infinite minimal choice sets iff
Where ≺ = ⊂, the same result can be obtained for a specific class of premise sets Γ ⊆ W + : The above results are of crucial importance for the completeness and equivalence results of both SAL m c and HAL m , which we shall present subsequently. The following additional lemmas will also be useful in the remainder:
Proof. Case 1. Γ is not LLL + -satisfiable. In that case, Γ ⊢ LLL + A for every A ∈ Ω, whence Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ) = {Ω (i) } and Φ ⊏ (Γ) = {Ω}. Hence the lemma follows immediately.
Case 2. Γ is LLL + -satisfiable. Suppose ϕ ∈ Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ) for an i ∈ I. By Theorem 6.2, there is an M ∈ M AL m 
. Since by Theorem 6.1, Ab(M ′ ) ∈ Φ ⊏ (Γ), the lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 8 For every
ϕ ∈ Φ ⊏ (Γ), ϕ ∩ Ω (i) ∈ Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ). Proof. Assume that ϕ ∈ Φ ⊏ (Γ), but ϕ ∩ Ω (i) ∈ Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ). Note that since ϕ is a choice set of Σ(Γ), ϕ ∩ Ω (i) is a choice set of Σ (i) (Γ). Hence there is a ψ ∈ Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ) such that ψ ⊏ (i) ϕ. By Lemma 7, there is a ψ ′ ∈ Φ ⊏ (Γ) such that ψ ′ ∩ Ω (i) = ψ. But then by Fact 5.2, ψ ′ ⊏ ϕ -a contradiction. Corollary 9 Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ) = {ϕ ∩ Ω (i) | ϕ ∈ Φ ⊏ (Γ)}.
Lemma 9
If c Φ ⊏ (Γ) has no infinite minimal choice sets, then for every i ∈ I, c Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ) has no infinite minimal choice sets.
Proof. Let Θ be an infinite minimal choice set of c Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ). By Corollary 9,
= {∅} which is a contradiction to the minimality of Θ. Thus:
′ is a choice set of c Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ), which contradicts the minimality of Θ. Hence Θ is a minimal choice set of c Φ ⊏ (Γ).
Restricted Completeness and Equivalence for SAL m c
The basic completeness/equivalence criterion for SAL 
Lemma 10 If for all
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ W and Γ satisfies ⋆ SAL m c . Thus, c Φ ⊏ (Γ) has no infinite minimal choice sets.
If Γ is not LLL + -satisfiable, then by Fact 9.1 and the monotonicity of LLL + , Cn SAL m (i) (Γ) is not LLL + -satisfiable for every i ∈ I. Also, by Definition 5,
(Γ) = ∅, whence the lemma follows immediately. So suppose that Γ is LLL + -satisfiable. We will prove by induction that for every i ∈ I,
(Γ), whence by Lemma 10, the property follows immediately. 
The rest follows immediately in view of Facts 6 and 8.
(
By the induction hypotheses and Definition 5,
By Theorem 12 and (4),
By the supposition and Lemma 9, c Φ ⊏ (i+1) (Γ) has no infinite minimal choice sets. Hence in view of (5), c Φ (i+1) (Γ ′ ) has no infinite minimal choice sets. By Theorem 14.1 and Lemma 6,
Hence in view of Definition 7,
has an infinite minimal choice set. By Lemma 5,
By Corollary 6 and the monotonicity of
In view of Theorem 20, we immediately obtain:
is not complete for all premise sets -we refer to Appendix C.3 for a counterexample. Notably, this example also illustrates that in some cases, HAL m may yield more consequences that SAL m c . 
If
Φ ⊏ (Γ) is finite, then Γ satisfies ⋆ SAL m c . 8. Γ satisfies ⋆ SAL m c iff for no i ∈ I, c Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ) has infinite minimal choice sets. Σ(Γ) is finite f.a. ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ), ϕ is finite Φ(Γ) is finite f.a. i ∈ I, Φ (i) (Γ) is finite Γ satisfies ⋆ HAL m Φ ⊏ (Γ) is finite f.a. i ∈ I, Φ ⊏ (i) is finite Γ satisfies ⋆ SAL m c f.a. i ∈ I, c Φ ⊏ (i) (Γ) has no infinite minimal choice sets
Some Additional Results
Some properties which were hitherto not proven for SAL m c and HAL m , follow almost immediately from the soundness results together with Corollaries 11 and 12. These properties are:
Each of these was proven to hold for L = AL 
Suppose that A ∈ Cn PAL (Γ ∪ Γ ′ ). By the soundness of PAL, A is true in every M ∈ M PAL (Γ ∪ Γ ′ ). Hence by (7), A is true in every M ∈ M PAL (Γ). Since Γ obeys ⋆ PAL , it follows that A ∈ Cn PAL (Γ). 
In Conclusion
Let us briefly recapitulate the main results of this paper. We have shown that the semantic selections defined by AL 
APPENDIX A Some Syntactic Proofs
In this section, we define a generic proof theory for logics in AL m ≺ -format -as before, ≺ is a metavariable for both ⊂ and ⊏. We do so without further comments -for illustrations and philosophical motivations, we refer to [24, Section 2] . Subsequently, we prove two Theorems which call for syntactic meta-proofs and were therefore ommitted from the main text. Both meta-proofs rely only on theorems stated in Section 2. 
, there is no line on which A is derived on a condition Θ for which Θ ∩ ϕ = ∅.
Put differently: a line with formula A is unmarked at stage s iff its condition has an empty intersection with at least one ϕ ∈ Φ ≺ s (Γ), and for every ψ ∈ Φ ≺ s (Γ), there is a line on which A is derived on a condition ∆ such that ∆ ∩ ψ = ∅. As a line may be marked at stage s, unmarked at a later stage s ′ and marked again at a still later stage s ′′ , we also define a stable notion of derivability.
Definition 11 A is finally derived from Γ on line l of a finite stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line l, (ii) line l is unmarked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the proof at stage s, in which line l is marked may be further extended in such a way that line l is unmarked again. Proof. Suppose the antecedent holds, and let ∆ be a finite subset of Γ. By the supposition, there is an M ∈ M LLL + (Γ ∪ Ω¬ (i) ), whence M Dab(∆). By the soundness of
Lemma 18 If Γ is normal up to level i, then at every stage s of a proof from Γ,
Proof. Suppose the antecedent holds and let s be a stage of a proof from Γ. Assume
s (Γ)}. By the supposition and Lemma 17, every Θ ∈ Σ Proof. Suppose the antecedent holds and A ∈ Cn ULL (i) (Γ), whence Γ ∪ Ω¬ (i) ⊢ LLL + A. By the compactness of LLL + , there are B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Γ and there is a finite ∆ ⊂ Ω (i) such that {B1, . . . , Bn} ∪ ∆¬ ⊢ LLL + A. By the Deduction Theorem, {B1, . . . , Bn} ⊢ LLL+ A∨ Dab(∆).
Let p be an AL m ⊏ -proof from Γ, obtained by (i) introducing all the premises Bi (i ≤ n) and (ii) deriving A on the condition ∆ from these premises, by the rule RC. Let l be the line on which A is derived.
Assume that l is marked. It follows that there is a ϕ ∈ Φ ⊏ s (Γ) such that ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅, whence ϕ ∩ Ω (i) = ∅. By Lemma 18, Γ is not normal up to level i -a contradiction. By the same reasoning, it follows that in every extension of p, line l remains unmarked. Hence A is finally derived in p, whence A ∈ Cn AL m ⊏ (Γ).
B Criteria for Equivalence
For the proof of Theorem 21, we will rely on two facts and a lemma about minimal choice sets. The first fact was proven in [17] (Lemma 3.2.4) , the second is an immediate consequence of Theorem 12 and Definition 5. 
Lemma 19
If Σ is a finite set of sets, then Σ has no infinite minimal choice sets.
Proof. Let Σ = {Θi | i ≤ n} and let ϕ be an infinite choice set of Σ. For every i ≤ n, let Ai be an arbitrary element of ϕ ∩ Θi, and let ϕ ′ = {A1, . . . , An}. Note that since ϕ ′ is finite, ϕ ′ ⊂ ϕ. Since ϕ ′ is a choice set of Σ, ϕ is not a minimal choice set of Σ.
C.1 Some Particular Prioritized Adaptive Logics
Several ALs have been developed to explicate reasoning with prioritized belief bases -see [8] , [27] and [26] , and [23, Section 6] . The ALs that deal with such belief bases typically use a certain logical operator or a sequence of such operators to express that a belief has a certain degree of plausibility. We will define three such systems, one in each of the three generic formats, in order to prove the negative results we promised in Section 1. We restrict the logic to the propositional level. We use the standard modal language L M of Kripke's minimal normal modal logic K . As usually, we define ♦A = ¬ ¬A. Let W M denote the set of modal wffs, and W l the set of literals (sentential letters and their negations). To express the plausibility degree of a piece of information, sequences of diamonds are used: ♦♦ . . . ♦A. The longer the sequence, the less plausible the information. A sequence of i diamonds will be abbreviated by ♦ i -♦ 0 denotes the empty string. We will define prioritized logics that allow for the defeasible inference from ♦ i A (where i ∈ N) to A. This is done by defining "A is plausible (to degree i), but false" as an abnormality (of rank i). Where A ∈ W l , let ! i A abbreviate ♦ i A ∧ ¬A. Every set of abnormalities Ω Υ2 = {ϕ k | k ∈ N} = {{! 2 qi, ! 1 pj, ! 2 r | i ∈ N − {k}, j ≥ k} | k ∈ N} By Theorem 7, Φ ⊏ 2 (Γ 1 ) ⊆ Φ (2) (Γ 1 ). Note that for every ϕ ∈ Υ2, {! 2 qi | i ∈ N} ⊏ K ϕ. Hence Φ ⊏ 2 (Γ 1 ) = {! 2 qi | i ∈ N}.
By Theorem 21.7, we can derive:
Corollary 14 c Φ ⊏ (2) (Γ 1 ) has no infinite minimal choice sets.
Lemma 21 Γ 1 |= HK2 m c s.
Proof. We prove that Γ 1 |= K2 m Since Θ is finite, there is a k ∈ N such that, for every l ≥ k: ! 1 p l ∈ Θ. Let M ∈ M K + (Γ 1 ) be such that each of the following holds: Ad 5. Let Θ4 = {! 1 pi∨! 1 pj∨! 2 q | i, j ∈ N, i = j}. Let Ψ = {{! 1 pi | i ∈ N − {k}} | k ∈ N}. Note that Φ (2) (Θ4) = {{! 2 q}} ∪ Ψ, whereas Φ ⊏ (2) (Θ4) = {{! 2 q}}.
The last example is also a counterexample for the right-left direction of Lemma 13. That is, although c Φ (2) (Θ4) has an infinite minimal choice set (i.e. the set {! 1 pi | i ∈ N}), it can be shown that M K + (Cn HK2 m (Θ4)) = M HK2 m (Θ4).
